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Law 
JCrCmie Gilbert 
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The history of indigenous peoples is a bloody and unfinished account of a fight to 
protect their lands against invaders. Since indigenous peoples' experience with 
international law has had, and still has, much more to do with theories of dispassession, 
at first glance it might seem quite ironic and paradoxical to include a chapter concerning 
indigenous peoples in a book dedicated to theories of acquisition in international law. 
Since the early developments of international law, indigenous peoples have beem victims 
of specific interpretations of legal doctrines of acquisition of land. The making of 
treaties and concepts of terra nullius and displacement were the classical ways of 
dispossession, whereby indigenous territories were 'legitimately' acquired. The position 
of indigenous peoples in today's society is mostly a consequence of the famous doctrine 
of the 'three Cs', civilization, Christianization and commerce, for which international 
law, as the legal instrument of colonial conquest, was largely culpable. Today the 
' position of indigenous peoples can be subsumed in one idea: they are the first inplabitants 
of lands they are not allowed to own or use. Their situation is an illustrati~n of the 
modern development of theories concerning acquisition of land. In respowe to the 
development of anti-racist legislations and the rejection of colonialist theoribs, states 
have developed an arsenal of legal theories legitimizing acquisition of indigenous 
peoples' territory. In this evolution legal discourse has been an important plsiyground 
for the development of theories of acquisition versus recognition and protection of 
fundamental rights, in which indigenous peoples' rights is a growing area. 
In spite of the fact that the term 'indigenous peoples' is used in internatSonal law 
and generally in literature, the definition is not yet universally resolved (the term 
'peoples' in international law also evades definition).' However, to recognize the 
importance of land rights within the indigenous peoples' discourse, it is vital to 
focus on the question of who indigenous peoples are. From a legal perspective, the 
~ ~ 
For an informed discussion on those issues, see Makkonen (2000). 
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term 'indigenous peoples' may refer to different notions following the regional 
understanding of such a concept.' Although the UN system is elaborate,' there is no 
clear definition of the term 'indigenous peoples'. The definition proposed by Cobo in 
his Study of the Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples is usually accepted as 
a~thori tat ive.~ The definition proposed is a mix between 'objective' criteria, such as 
'historical continuity', and 'subjective' factors including self-definition. Three criteria 
seem to be fundamental to this definition. First, indigenous peoples are descendants 
of original inhabitants of territories since colonized by foreigners with culture, language, 
ancestry and occupation of land all constitutive evidence of continuity. Second, they 
have distinct cultures, which set them apart from the dominant society. And, third, 
they have a strong sense of self-identitySs 
In this context land has to be accepted as a vital element of indigenou~ culture! 
Thus, the link between land and indigenous peoples is the definitive factor that 
distinguishes them from other populations. To understand the basic features that 
make different indigenous cultures, we must understand the crucial importance of 
the land rights issue, The misunderstanding of indigenous peoples' relationship with 
their homelands by non-indigenous societies is a key factor inherent in the threat of 
'western' legal systems to indigenous survival. Although this relationship is based 
on the need to find resources, the precise characteristic of the relationship is deeper 
and not restricted to the physical element? In his definition, UN Special Rapporteur 
Cobo states: 
? See Russel (1986) and also Declaration on the Rights of Asian Indigenous Peoples, adopted 
at the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact General Assembly Meeting, Chiangmai, Thailand, 18-23 
May 1993, in APJHRL 1 (2000) 165-8. 
For a review of the UN system on indigenous peoples, see HCHR, Fact Sheet No. 9 (Rev. 
I), The Rights of indigenous Peoples, Programme of Activities for the International Decade of 
the World's Indigenous Peoples (1995-2004), General Assembly Resolution 501157 of December 
1995, Annex. 
The Sub-Commission called it 'a reference work of definitive usefulness' and invited the 
Working Group to rely on it; see Sub-Commission Res. 1985122, para. 4(a). 
More recently, the Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene A. Daes has defined indigenous peoples 
on the following criteria: priority in time, voluntary perpetuation of their cultural distinctiveness, 
self-identification as indigenous and experience of subjugations, marginalization, dispossession, 
exclusion and discrimination by the dominant society; Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, 19 July 2000, UN Doc. E/CN.41Sub.2/2000110. 
Rouland describes the territorial issue as the 'anchorage' of the right to be different for 
indigenous peoples ('L'ancrage du droit a la difference: les droits territoriaux'); Rouland et 
al. (1996: 468). 
In most of the indigenous cultures the land is called 'Mother Earth'; 'they do not own the 
land but the land (the "Mother Earth") owns them and generates them as sons'; Rouland et al. 
(1996: 468). 
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they form a non-dominant sector of society and are determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories. 
(Cobo 1983: para. 379) 
Land is inherited from descendants and 'ownership' of traditional homelands and its 
transmission to future generations is a vital component of indigenousness. Thus land 
rights have to be viewed as an expression of tribal unity and perpetuation. Pre- 
colonialism, the dominant feature of ownership for the majority of indigenous peoples 
was collective, with its source in local indigenous customary laws that were never 
recognized by colonial powers and, subsequently, independent states.* The negation 
of this customary law by non-indigenous legal systems is an important element in the 
possession of indigenous territory (see Sheleff 1999 and McNeil2000). 
While international law is the main subject of this discussion, the first place of 
redressal for indigenous peoples is before national courts. Native titles are usually 
granted by national legislation. This state practice, via the consent of state parties, 
transmits directly in international law. This chapter concentrates mainly on the study 
of the law governing indigenous (or 'aboriginal' or 'native') titles. An 'indigenous 
title' for this purpose is understood as a right to land given to a community that occupied 
the land at the time of colonization. Thus, the focus will be on states where indigenous 
populations represent an important part of the population and they have been 
dispossessed by colonial settlement. Based on these interlinked criteria, the situations 
in Canada, Australia and Scandinavia will be closely examined. 
It needs to be stated at the outset that references to 'land' and 'territory' have been 
used alternatively. Indigenous claims are usually based on both notions. However, 
there is clear preference for recognition of territorial rather than land rights. A'territory' 
refers to the totality of 'the environment of the areas which the peoples concerned 
occupy or otherwise use'? which is a broader concept than merely the land.1° 
Recognition of such customary systems is a difficult feature for states. For example, Danish 
juridical expeditions to Greenland in charge of determining 'how far it was possible to introduce 
unity of law between Denmark and Greenland' concluded that indigenous customary law 'is 
not a closed system such as a modem dogmatically defined system of law. Customary law is a 
"living law", not written law. Data gathering must be concemed with the whole cultural context'; 
as quoted in Craig and Freeland (1998: 8). 
ILO Convention 169 is the only instrument that refers to such a distinction. Article 13 states 
that the 'use of the term "lands" . . . shall include the concept of territories, which covers the 
total environment of the areas which the peoples concemed occupy or otherwise use'; Convention 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO No. 169, 72, ILO 
OSJicial Bull, 59 (1989). See also Assies (1998: 15). 
lo However, use of the plural in the expression 'rights to land' refers to the total issue of rights 
to land including traditional rights to enjoy fishing and/or hunting, a i  well as rights to the 
protection of the land in general. Thus, the notion of territory is mainly a reference to a right to 
manage land. 
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Nevertheless, since international law and national laws usually refer to both terms 
without distinction," references to both concepts are necessary. However, since 
indigenous peoples claim the right to own land as well as rights to manage and own 
their natural resources, it is important to keep in mind the implications of 'territory' in 
understanding indigenous claims. 
The issues of land, territory and resources are clearly related to the right of self- 
determination since the ultimate purpose of territorial rights includes the right to 
own and manage land with maximum liberty. While a focus on the issue of self- 
determination alone would not be a complete representation of the debate concerning 
land rights it is nonetheless important to recognize the 'shadow' that self-determination 
casts on a discussion about indigenous land rights.I2 In this regard, the issue of indigenous 
peoples' rights to land is often regarded as a question of 'internal self-determination' 
rather than an issue relating to international boundary disputes.13 
Law and Indigenous Land Rights 
The legal environment of the conquest of indigenous territories was one where colonial 
powers developed theories in favour of a right to dispossess. These doctrines of 
discovery and unequal treaties between indigenous peoples and invaders were used to 
legitimate acquisition of indigenous lands. While terra nullius is no longer recognized 
as a legal tool for acquiring indigenous peoples' lands,'* it was historically a vital 
legal doctrine, justifying dispossession of indigenous peoples. 
The 'Valladolid controversy' is a well-known example of the development of theories 
justifying the right to dispossess indigenous peoples.'With the 'three Cs' theory forming 
its main thrust, the Catholic Church is severely implicated in this disposse~sion. '~ 
For an example of the alternative use of the two notions, see the Draft Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1994/2/Add. 1 (1994). 
I? For discussions on the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples, see Aikio and 
Scheinin (2000) and Maivan Clech Liim (2000). 
l3 Internal self-determination is 'referring to the internal political and economic organization 
of a people, without necessarily affecting already existing external relations'; Stavenhagen 
(1994): 20). 
l 4  See Western Sahara case, ICJ Reports (1975) 12 at 16 and High Court of Australia, Mabo v. 
Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. 
I s  The 'Valladolid controversy' was a discussion between Sepulveda and Las Casas in 1550. 
The issue of the 'scientific' debate between those two 'scientists' was to define whether the 
'Indians' of the South American colonies were some 'natural inferior human' or not. For a 
general review of all the legal doctrines of those times, see Rouland et al. (1996: ch. 3). 
l6 A good example is the Inter Caetera bull from Pope Alexander VI which, in the name of the 
development of Christianity, shared the world between Portugal and Spain; see Henderson 
(1997). 
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Traditionally, the Christianization of indigenous peoples provided a doctrinal basis 
for non-recognition of the sacred importance of the land. As Scheinin writes: 
the essentially Christian-based approach to the practice of religion fails to address indigenous 
beliefs that treat the land itself as sacred, not merely a piece of property suitable for certain 
isolated religious practice. 
(Scheinin 1999: 5) 
Nevertheless, fulfilment of these elaborate theories was only achieved through military 
domination or by fraudulent perpetration of unequal treaties (Daes 2000: 10-1 1). Later 
legal justification of indigenous dispossession was based on notions of terra nullius 
and discovery (see Chapters 1-3), interpreted in a racist manner. It is now accepted 
that such legal theory was merely the handmaiden of the perpetration of European 
political ambition," and the international community has recognized these theories as 
blatantly racist and illegitimate,18 though they continue to be discussed before national 
courts.19 Modern state-building had direct consequences for proprietary rights of 
indigenous peoples. As highlighted by Makkonen: 
although the vast majority of the world's about 190 states are . . . polyethnic, most of them 
retain nation-statal ideas and do not formally recognize their internal diversity. 
(Makkonen 2000: 32) 
In this process, non-recognition of indigenous peoples' rights to own land collectively 
is part of the process of assimilation as states seek to create a homogeneous society. In 
some states indigenous peoples have no right to own land irrespective of disposses~ion.~~ 
In countries where they have the right to occupy traditional lands, indigenous peoples 
are usually perceived as using public or national lands as a 'gift' from the government. 
In the British Commonwealth system though, indigenous peoples have exclusive use 
and occupancy of land though the respective governments are its owners. Thus even 
when indigenous peoples have a legal right to their lands this right is subject to the 
legal theory of 'the power to extinguish'. States have always had the power to extinguish 
if they perceive the 'need'. In this sense Special Rapporteur Daes (2000: 14, para. 40) 
states that the concept of aboriginal title is itself discriminatory since 'it provides only 
l 7  An illustration of such hypocritical theory was the right of white settlers in Tasmania to 
shoot aborigines, after whose decimation the island.could factually have been 'terra nullius'. 
'"astern~reenland decision, PC11 (1993) and the Western ~ a h a r a  case. ICJ Reports (1975) 
12. 
l9 See the discussion below about the Mabo decision in Australia. 
'-O Daes (2000: 36) states 'One of the most widespread contemporary problems is the failure of 
States to recognize the existence of indigenous land use, occupancy and ownership, and the 
failure to accord appropriate legal status and legal rights to protect this use, occupancy and 
ownership.' 
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defective, vulnerable and inferior iegal status for indigenous land and resource 
ownership'. Thus, although terra nullius has been deemed racist, at present there are 
still legal frameworks that allow states to discriminate vis-a-vis indigenous land 
rights. 
The right of expropriation is recognized by international law, but the power to 
extinguish a title is very different. Extinguishment of such indigenous titles is usually 
at the behest of grants of such territory to non-indigenous holders. If the indigenous 
right to land is 'inconsistent' with the grant given to non-indigenous holders, such a 
grant would 'extinguish' the indigenous right. This right to extinguish usually allows 
states to take land without c~mpensat ion.~ '  Indigenous peoples remain, in most 
instances, the only part of society that can be victims of the 'extinguishing' of their 
right to their lands. As observed by Sambo: 
. . . the origoing implementation of state extinguishments policies constitutes a very serious 
threat to indigenous societies. It is another relic of colonialism. Extinguishment is used to 
ensure state domination of indigenous peoples and to serve their ancestral ties to their own 
territories. 
(Sambo 1993: 31) 
US Supreme Court Judges echo these sentiments: 
No case in this Court has ever held that taking of Indian title or use by Congress required 
compensation. The American people have compassion for the descendants of those Indians 
who were deprived of their homes and hunting grounds by the drive ~f civilization. They 
seek to have the Indians share the benefits of our society as citizens of this nation. Generous 
provision has been willingly made to allow tribes to recover for wrongs, as a matter of 
grace, not because of legal liability.22 
Via this decision taken in 1995 the Supreme Court recognized that the government is 
entitled to take Indian land without due process or compensation in direct contravention 
of the constitution. This decision is a direct consequence of the legal theory of 'plenary 
power' that allows the possibility for state control of the use of the land 'without 
regard for constitutional limits on governmental power that would otherwise be 
applicable' (Daes 2000: 16, para. 47). Thus the theory of plenary power differs 
marginally from the theory of extinguishments in that it requires prescribed legal 
procedures to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, both 'legal' theories are discriminatory and it 
is difficult to understand how such practices are used in states such as Canada, Australia 
and the USA in clear violation of basic human rights.23 Even when land agreements 
a Usually extinguishments can only be made by a governmental Act requiring 'clear and 
plain intention', 
" Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1995), quoted in Daes (2000: 15). 
'3 CERD has commented on this issue, see p. 224. 
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are based on treaties between indigenous peoples and states, governments often deny 
effect to these, violating them in the absence of legal remedies (see Brownlie 1992). 
The Special Rapporteur on the issue of indigenous peoples and their relationship to 
land, highlights that 
[It] is safe to say that the attitudes, doctrines and policies developed to justify the taking of 
lands from indigenous peoples were and continue to be largely driven by the economic 
agendas of States. 
(Daes 2000: 9) 
Removals or relocations of indigenous peoples were often effected as practical 
expression of such agendas and were often justified as a solution for 'overpopulation, 
need for resettlement, transmigration, resources exploitation and security' (ibid.). There 
are many examples of forced relocation of indigenous peoples because of 'developmental' 
projects that include dam construction, eucalyptus tree plantations, and so on.24 States 
can be deemed responsible for the threat to indigenous peoples' lands by implementing 
policies such as settlement programmes on indigenous lands. For instance, the current 
Chiapas uprising in Mexico stems from the question of land ownership and is a direct 
result of repeated governmental policy over the last fifty years including governmental 
encouragement of mass migration to the region and displacement policies towards 
indigenous populations (see Wilson 1998). 
International Legal Regimes and the Protection of Indigenous Land Rights 
Having previously been an instrument in effect putting colonialism on a legal footing, 
international law is'shifting to give voice to the victims of a legal system based on 
'western concepts'.25 It was only during the 1970s that international human rights law 
rejected its assimilationist approach and started to recognize their unique existence 
and specific Modem international law seeks to protect the right of indigenous 
peoples to land in two ways: first, through specific instruments that especially deal 
with such an issue and, second, via instruments that do not specifically deal with the 
24 For examples of 'developmental' projects and their effects, see 'Refuge, Canada's periodical 
on Refugees', Environmental Refugees 12(1) (June 1992). 
'"he first international instrument that gave protection to indigenous peoples is the 'Covenant 
of the League of Nations'; art. 23 requires just treatment for native inhabitants in territories 
under the control of members of the League. For a chronology of international instruments 
relating to indigenous peoples, see Havemann (1999a: 19), 
26 International human rights law usually regarded 'indigenous peoples' as 'minorities' entitled 
to general minority rights protection. The first document distinguishing the two notions is the 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous 
Populations (1 972). 
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right to land, but which give opportunities to mobilize other existing recognized rights 
to protect indigenous rights to land. In this regard, the interpretation of existing rights to 
include indigenous peoples' right to land is an important feature of existing international 
law. The next section explores the major instruments of international human rights 
law that contain these specific references to the land right issuee2' 
UN and Indigenous Peoples' Rights to Land 
The UN General Assembly has proclaimed the International Decade of the World's 
Indigenous Peoples (1994-2004).28 One of the purposes of this decade is the adoption 
of the 'Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples'. This declaration, 
proposed by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1993,19 was rejected 
by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) comprising state representatives. 
However, the commission is presently discussing adoption of the draft declaration30 
with amendments amenable to its members. This instrument seeks to strike: 
. . . a balance between the right of indigenous peoples to be different and to control their 
own affairs, and their right to participate fully in the wider society. 
(Burger 1998: 10) 
The spirit of the draft declaration is one of invitation to governments to base their 
relationship with indigenous communities and individuals on consent. In this regard, 
it deals with a wide range of issues including language rights, education, health and 
employment. Article 10 of the declaration, dealing with land rights, states: 
Indigenous Peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No 
relocation shall take place without the free and informed consent of the indigenous 
peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation, and, where 
possible, with the option of return.31 
In addition, art. 25 recognizes spiritual and material relationships of indigenous 
peoples with their homelands and highlights that 'land and territories' include the . 
27 For a review of the instruments that might be applicable to indigenous peoples, see Daes 
(2000: Annex). 
28 See CHR, International Decade for the World's Indigenous People: Activities Undertaken 
Within the United Nations System in Preparation for the Decade, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/101. 
Within the UN agenda, 1993 was declared the International Year for the World's Indigenous 
Peoples. 
29 The preliminary text of the draft declaration was issued in 1985. 
The Working Group of the CHR is in charge of redrafting; see Working Group of the 
Commission on the Draft Declaration Report, UN Doc. EfCN.412002185. 
3 1  Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. EICN.4/Sub.U1994/2/ 
Add. 1 (1 994). 
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whole environment of 'lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora, fauna and other 
resources'. Article 26 then refers to 'the right to own, develop, control and use the 
lands and territories . . . which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied 
or used', States have objected to the use of the past tense and some are more in 
favour of the formula used by the ILO Convention that only deals with land that 
remains in use.32 Where the return of land is not a possibility, indigenous peoples 
would have the right to just and fair compensation, as enshrined in art. 27. In 
general, all the articles referring to land rights also recognize collective ownership 
of land and invite state governments to take into account and respect indigenous 
traditions, customs and land tenure systems. It is important to bear in mind that 
this document was produced by a body of human rights experts with significant 
participation by indigenous representatives. The final declaration is likely to be severely 
restrictive, since it has to be adopted by the CHR comprising state representatives. 
During discussions thus far, state concern has centred on the protection of national 
land tenure systems, state ownership of minerals and state power to e~propr i a t e .~~  It 
is also important to stress that declarations are statements of purpose rather than 
legally binding documents. However, with the theoretical deadline for its adoption 
looming and with fundamental differences still remaining it is unlikely to be passed 
within the timeframe. In a recent debate of the Working Group for the CHR, Canada 
asked for an amendment to the draft stressing a distinction between 'lands' and 
'territories' and clarification between 'traditional use' and 'property'" arguing that 
the wording was ' t b  prescriptive' with regard to conflicts of laws.35 The Australian 
representatives too expressed reservations with the drafting of the declaration, whilst 
Guatemala called for an agreement of norms governing the concept of indigenous 
peoples, recognition of collective rights, self-determination and land rights before 
discussing the articles. Although the issue of land and resources is recognized as 
vital by all governments, their positions with regard to the provisions of the draft 
declaration vary considerably. 
The first indigenous claim before an international body took place during the 1920~,3~ 
but the UN showed direct interest in indigenous issues only in the 1970s with the 
Sub-Commission on Protection of Minorities initiating a study of the problem of 
32 See Barsh (1996: 801). The countries concerned are Australia, Canada and the USA. 
On the formulation of land rights (arts. 26 and 27) only Colombia found such formulation 
'acceptable in principle', whereas most of the states found it 'objectionable in parts'. 
34 For more information about the actual debate on the adoption of the draft declaration, see 
Indigenous Peoples' Centre for Documentation, Research and Information, <http:www.docip.org>, 
visited 23/04/01. 
j5 Update No. 37, JanuaryIMarch 2001, Working Group on the Draft Declaration, Geneva, 6th 
session, 20 November-1 December 2000. 
" The Iroquois Chief Deskaheh was the first indigenous 'activist' at international level, spending 
several months lobbying the League of the Nations in 1.923. 
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discrimination against indigenous  population^.^^ In 1982 it created the Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations as its subsidiary organ.38 Since then, this working group 
has collected comments and suggestions concerning the draft declaration from hundreds 
of indigenous groups, NGOs, IGOs and governments (see Schulte-Tenckoff 1997). 
The first study especially dealing with land issues followed the first draft of the 
declaration in the 1990s. It was only in 1997 that the CHR appointed Ms Daes as 
Special Rapporteur 'to prepare a working paper on indigenous people and their 
relationship to land with a view to suggesting practical measures to address ongoing 
problems in that regard'. The Special Rapporteur completed her preliminary working 
paper in 1997 examining the facilitation of understanding of the provisions relevant 
to land rights contained in the draft de~larat ion.~~ Examining state perspectives on the 
issues, she found that their prime objection related to the difficulty of reconciling 
indigenous land claims with the need for 'certainty and security'of land titles. Another 
difficulty was the manner in which indigenous land regimes could be integrated with 
the 'goal of a functional and stable nation-state'. The final working paper was submitted 
in 2001 even though only four states (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Denmark) 
submitted comments and information, with South American and Asian states refusing 
to participate. 
This paper is certainly the most complete work on the subject produced on behalf 
of the UN and more generally in international law. The report analyses the importance 
of the indigenous peoples' relation with their homelands and explores the contemporary 
problems faced by indigenous peoples in such a relationship. 
ILO: The Only Binding Protection 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has adopted two Conventions on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Convention 107 and 169)"" which protect the lands 
of indigenous peoples.41 In this regard the ILO became active in this field long before 
the UN (Heintze 1993). In fact the ILO began to address indigenous peoples' issues 
through the rights of native workers in 1921 (the ILO was created in 1919). Its most 
j7 See the series of documents prepared by Special Rapporteur Cobo between 1973 and 1984, 
Cobo (1983 and 198617). 
js The Working Group on Indigenous Populations is composed of five members who are 
independent experts of the Sub-Commission. 
39 See Preliminary Working Paper prepared by Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, UN Doc. EICN.4ISub.U 
1997/17,20 June 1997 and Corr. 1. 
'O The ILO adopted Convention No. 107 in 1957 and Convention No. 169 in 1989. For an 
overview of the ILO system, see Swepston (1998). 
It must be emphasized that some indigenous representatives were unhappy with the lack of 
consultation and have invited states not to ratify this convention; see 'Resolution of the Indigenous 
Peoples', Preparatory Meeting Relating to the ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Geneva, 28 July 1989. 
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significant contribution on indigenous issues was the adoption of Convention No. 169 
(1989) revealing the organization as the cutting-edge for expression of indigenous 
concerns. This convention deals with a range of different issues and includes the land 
rights issue. Even though at first glance it could seem paradoxical that an organization 
dedicated to workers' rights has produced a convention referring to indigenous land 
rights, today the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
CountriesQ remains the only universal binding standard on indigenous land rights. 
This convention recognizes the collective character of.the relationship of indigenous 
peoples with their land, especially noting its spiritual and cultural i r np~ r t ance .~~  At 
least nine of its 44 articles clearly deal with the land issue with the entire second part 
specifically dedicated to the right to land.44 Article 14, in particular, contains a 
fundamental expression of indigenous rights to land: 
The right of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they 
traditionally occupy shall be recognised. 
Use of the word 'recognize' implicitly suggests that the occupation of the land by 
indigenous peoples gives a right to possession that must be 'recognized' by the state. 
This underscores the LO Committee of Experts statement that the convention does 
not necessarily require 'full title', as long as 'possession is secure'.45 Article 14(3) 
invites governments to take necessary steps to identify lands which indigenous peoples 
traditionally occupied, guarantee effective protection of ownership and possessory 
rights and to take adequate procedures within domestic jurisdiction to resolve land 
claims. Since no reference is made to temporal limitations, these procedures could 
arguably also include past claims. In this context Anaya has commented that this 
article is: 
. . . a response to the historical processes that have afflicted indigenous peoples, processes 
that have trampled on their cultural attachment to ancestral lands, disregarded or minimized 
their legitimate property interests, and left them without adequate means of subsistence. 
(Anaya 1996: 106) 
Article 16 expresses the prohibition of removal of peoples from lands and seeks creation 
of minimum legal standards for 'relocation'. Article 1 6(2) stresses the fundamental 
42 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO No. 
169,72 ILO ODcial Bull. 59, 1989, see especially arts. 4 and 7. 
43 For example, art. 13(1) states 'In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention 
Governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the 
peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which 
they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship.' 
44 See arts. 4,7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. 
45 Swepston (1998: 25); see 'Observation by the Committee of Experts', 1995 (Norway) para. 17. 
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conditions necessary in relocation, 'including consent and that such relocation must 
only be an exceptional measure. In discussing the nature of 'necessary relocation', 
the conference resisted specific definition so as not to pre-empt such action.46 Swepston 
(1998) suggests that the ILO has tried to set up 'a series of hurdles to be passed, with 
public hearings as insurance against abuse' in case of relocation. He concedes that 
whilst this does not always prevent abuse it marginally diminishes the risk, However, 
one of the most positive aspects of art. 16 is the recognition of the 'right to return' 
when the reason for removal ceases. 
This convention is also the only legally binding international instrument that 
acknowledges recognition of indigenous land tenure systems and customs relating to 
the transmission of land that had been rejected by the forces of colonization (art. 17). 
A big impediment to the ILO system, however, remains the manner in which the 
convention is monitored. The submission of reports by states does not enable indigenous 
peoples to submit complaints - a fundamental flaw that weakens the effectiveness of 
the convention as a means of providing redress (BrUlmann, Lefeber and Zieck 1993: 
212). 
The Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples specifically 
deals with the right to land.47 This is recognized in the preamble (para. 5): 
. . . in many indigenous cultures, traditional collective systems for control and use of land, 
territory and resources . . . are a necessary condition for their survival . . . and. . . the form 
of such control and ownership is varied and distinctive and does not necessarily coincide 
with the systems protected by the domestic laws of the states in which they live. 
This proposed declaration highlights that ownership of traditional lands is part of the 
'right to cultural integrity' of indigenous peoples. Article VII states that indigenous 
communities are entitled to 'restitution in respect of the property of which they 
have been dispos~essed. '~~ According to art. XVIII 'Indigenous peoples have the 
right to the recognition of their property and ownership rights with respect to lands, 
territories and resources they have historically occupied, as well as to the use of 
those to which they have historically had access for their traditional activities and 
livelihood.' However, the document has no binding effects and remains a draft 
declaration. Thus, its contents are liable to change considerably before its possible 
adoption. 
- ~- - ~ 
46 Special Rapporteur Daes highlights that 'justification for relocations included overpopulation, 
need for resettlement, transmigration, resource exploitation and security'; see UN. Doc. El 
CN.4/Sub.2/200/25, p. 23. 
47 'Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples', approved by the 
IACHR on 26 February 1997 at its 1333rd session, 95th Regular Session, published in Annual 
Report of the IACHR (1996) p. 633. 
48 Article VII, para. 2, also adds that where such restitution is 'not possible, compensation on 
a basis not less favourable than the standard of international law' is required. 
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The appropriation or degradation of indigenous peoples' homelands is a continuing 
threat to their survival, therefore violating basic human rights such as the right to life 
or physical integrity of the person. The aim of the following section is to consider 
whether human rights law is able to protect indigenous peoples' relationship to their 
homelands in the face of these consequences. 
The HRC 
There is no specific article dealing with indigenous peoples in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).49 Nevertheless the HRC, the 
monitoring organ of this covenant, has often dealt with indigenous issues within the 
framework offered to minority rights. In its General Comment on art. 27, the HRC 
has stated that under the exercise of cultural rights protected by art. 27 of the ICCPR: 
. . . one or other aspect of the rights of individuals protected under that article - for example, 
to enjoy a particular culture - may consist in a way of life which is closely associated with 
territory and use of its resources: This may particularly be true . . . of indigenous communities 
constituting a minority . . . 
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under Article 27, the Committee 
observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 
associatecl with the use of land resources, especially in the case of Indigenous  people^.^^ 
Optional Protocol 'I to the covenant gives competence to the HRC to receive and 
consider communication from individuals claiming rights violation of the co~enant.~ '  
Even though the committee does not have any implementation mechanism, its decisions 
are important in terms of codification and evolution of international human rights 
law. Article 27 of the covenant recognizes that minorities 'shall not be denied the 
right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture'. 
On the basis of such protection the chief of a Canadian native Indian tribe, the Lubicon 
Lake Band, claimedthat Alberta's provincial government violated his right to enjoy 
his culture by expropriating part of the Band's territories to allow petrol extraction. 
The applicant especially emphasized that this exploration destroyed traditional hunting 
and trapping territory arid put their livelihood and subsistence in jeopardy.s2 The federal 
Canadian government was concerned since it had allowed the provincial Alberta 
49 ICCPR (1966), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/ 
63 16 (1 966), 999 UNTS 17 1, entered into force 23 March 1976. 
HRC, 'General Comments' No. 23 (50) on art, 27, Minority Rights, 6-4, 1994, paras. 3.2 
and 7. 
" Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 2 1 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 
59, UN Doc. A163 16 (1966), 999 UNTS 302, entered into force, 23 March 1976, Article I. 
S2 Communication no 16711984, Report of the HRC (A/45/40), vol. 2, annex IX A; CCPRtCI 
OPl2, para. 3.5. 
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government to expropriate the territory of the Band for the benefit of private corporate 
interests. The committee found that those concessions were in breach of art. 27 and 
condemned the government to pay some indemni t~?~ 
The committee has received other similar claims.s4 In Liinsmann et al. v. Finland, it 
stated that the right to enjoy one's culture could not be determined away from its context. 
This decision supports governments in allowing exploitation of natural resources or 
other economic activities in traditional indigenous territories, but establishes that these 
activities must not infringe too much upon indigenous peoples' way of life. In this 
case, permission to quarry and transport stones into indigenous territory was found 
not to be in breach of art. 27. Nevertheless, the committee stated that depending on 
the level of activities involved, such authorization 'may constitute a violation of the 
author's rights under Article 27, in particular of their right to enjoy their own culture'.55 
Until Namibia's declaration of independence in 1990, the Rehoboth Baster 
community had traditionally owned and controlled their homelands. Nevertheless, 
Namibia's new constitution states that all property or control over property comes 
under the jurisdiction of the government of Namibia. The late Captain of the community 
and others claimed before the HRC that such legislation violated their right, as entrusted 
by art. 27 of the ICCPR, since the land was used by the community for grazing cattle 
and cattle raising was 'an essential element in the culture of the c ~ m m u n i t y ' . ~ ~  The 
committee rejected their claim of violation on the basis that the applicants failed to 
prove that the community relationship with their traditional land was at the base of 
their distinctive culture. This decision was based primarily on the fact that the authors 
defined their culture 'almost solely in terms of the economic activity of grazing cattle'.s7 
Thus, since their claim was based on economic rather cultural grounds the protection 
offered by art. 27 was denied. 
In Hopu et al. v. France, the committee was asked to address the claims of two 
indigenous Polynesians from Tahiti following a decision allowing construction of a 
hotel on the site of their ancestral cemetery. They alleged that the project was a violation 
of their right to privacy and family lifees8 The HRC stated that the covenant required 
broad interpretation of the term 'family' to include those comprising 'the family' as 
s~ommunica t i~n  no 16711984, Report of the HRC (Al45/40), vol. 2, annex IX A; CCPR/Cl 
OPl2. 
" See Sara et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 5 1111992, UN GAOR, 52nd Sess., UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/58lDl5 1111 992; Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 1971 1985 (1988). 
'V1. Liinsman et al. v. Finland, paras. 9.6 and 9.8, Communication No. 51111992, UN-Doc. 
CCPWCl5UDl5 1111992 (1 993). 
'' J. G. A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia, 
Communication No. 76011997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/691D/76011997 (6 September 2000), para. 
10.6. 
" Individual opinion of Evatt, E. and Quiroga, C. M. (concurring). 
" Hopu et al. v. France, Communication No. 47111995, UN GAOR, 58th Sess., UN Doc 
CCPR/C/58/Dl67 1/1995. 
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understood in the society in question. Taking into account the specific situation, it 
concurred with the authors' claims that they considered their relationship to their ancestors 
an essential element of their identity with an important role in their family life.59 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the HRC is sensitive to the importance of the 
land rights issue for indigenous peoples, even though there is no specific provision in 
the ICCPR. The committee has developed the idea that such protection comes under 
notions of rights protecting minority cultures and individual family life. This posits 
legal recognition that, in human rights protection, culture and family life are two 
important aspects of indigenous peoples' relationship with their traditional homelands. 
The CERD 
Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination requires equality before law in the enjoyment of various rights, without 
distinction of race, colour, national or ethnic origin. This entitlement also refers to the 
right to own property individually and in association with others.60 The CERD monitors 
compliance by state parties to the convention. General Recommendation XXIII(5 1) 
of the committee deals specifically with indigenous peoples and focuses on the right 
to land, clearly stating that disrespect of such a right is the basis of discrimination 
against indigenous peoples. Highlighting the importance of the right to restitution, it 
calls on state parties to recognize and protect indigenous peoples' right to own, develop, 
control and use communal territories. In addition, it calls upon states to take steps to 
return territories that were taken away without free and informed consent. Dealing 
with restitution it states: 
Only when this [return] is for factual reasons not possible, the right to restitution should be 
substituted by the right to just, fair and prompt compensation. Such compensation should as 
far as possible take the form of lands and territories.61 
The monitoring mechanism under art. 9 of the convention has been occasionally 
successful in dealing with these issues.62 Australia, for example, has been called on to 
justify the content of its legislation concerning discriminatory aspects with regard to 
indigenous rights to land.63 
s9 Hopu et al. v. France, para. 10.3. Nevertheless, the fact that France has made a reservation 
on art. 27 of the ICCPR must be taken-into consideration in such a solution. 
* International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 
UNTS 195, reprinted in ILM 352 (1966), art. 5 (d)(v). 
6' CERD, General Recommendation XXIII (5 1) on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted 
at the committee's 1235& meeting, 18 August 1997, 95. 
62 For comments on this reporting procedure, see Steiner and Alston (2000: 773-8). 
63 See Reports Submitted by States Parties under art. 9 of the convention, TwelJih periodic reports 
of State Parties due in 1998, Australia, UN Doc. CERDlCl335lAdd.2, 14 December 1999. 
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The IA CHR 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has appreciated the 
connection between indigenous lands and indigenous survival in several cases (see 
Davis 1988). However, two cases are particularly good illustrations of the IACHR's 
position on this issue. The first case followed a petition submitted on behalf of the 
'Yanomami Indians' of Brazil. They alleged that the Brazilian government had violated 
their rights to life and health by constructing a highway through their territory, 
authorizing exploitation of their territorial resources and the subsequent intrusion of 
outsiders carrying contagious diseases into their territory. The commission found 
that because the government permitted this intrusion without providing medical 
care, there was a violation of the American con~ention.~" Following a petition on 
behalf of the 'Huaroni people*, the IACHR examined the human rights situation in 
E ~ u a d o r . ~ ~  This petition alleged that the Huaroni were under imminent threat of 
profound human rights violations due to planned oil exploitation activities within 
their traditional lands. Historically, during the colonization of Ecuador, the Huaroni 
were centralized in a small area on the western edge of their traditional land call the 
'Oriente' - officially designated a 'protected zone'. But following the discovery of 
oil in the region, the land was transformed into wasteland. The claim before the 
commission asserted that the effects of oil development and exploitation have not 
only damaged the environment, but also directly impaired the Huaroni's right to 
physical and cultural survival as a people. Following that claim, the commission in its 
report highlighted the need for adequate protective measures before the damage and 
recommended that: 
. . . the State take the measures necessary . . . to restrict settlers to areas which do not infringe 
upon the ability of indigenous peoples to preserve their traditional culture.66 
It is important to note, in the above cases, that the IACHR referred to specific rights, 
for example, the right to life and the right to health, to condemn violations of indigenous 
land rights. This emphasizes the lack of specific and adequate toois to protect indigenous 
peoples' specific relationship with their  homeland^.^' I 
64 Yanomarni Indian case, Case 7615, IACHR 24,OEAlSer.UV/l1.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985). 
6s IACHR, 'Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador', OEAISer. WIII.96, Doc. 
10 Rev. 1, Chap. IX, 24 April 1997. 
66 Ibid.: 12. 
67 A new case submitted to the court by the commission on behalf of the Mayana (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community concerns alleged violation of arts. 1 (Obligation to Respect Rights), 2 
(Domestic Legal Effect), 21 (Right to Private Property) and 25 (Judicial Protection) due to the 
failure of the state to demarcate and officially recognize the territory of the community. This 
case is currently in its preliminary objections phase. 
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Indigenous Land Rights and State Practice: Towards Customary International 
Law? 
Customary international law is a vital source of law that is accessible to international 
courts6* and national jurisdictions. To accede to the status of international custom, a 
norm must fulfil two criteria, First, the opinio juris criteria or the belief that a norm is 
accepted as law and, second, evidence of general state practice." 
Looking at the numerous activities that come under the umbrella of the UN, namely 
the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, the declaration of the Indigenous 
Decade, the work of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and the Draft 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, it can be argued that there is an 
existing. international custom relating to indigenous peoples' rights to land. In the 
words of Bennett and Powell: 
. . . on their own; these activities are not sufficient to constitute international custom, but, 
when taken in combination with state practice and the 1989 Convention on Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples, they go to demonstrate a steadily broadening consensus that aboriginal title 
is a rule of customary international law. 
(1999: 64) 
Anaya observes that all the different documents and instruments relating to indigenous 
peoples at international level express the existence of customary international law 
protecting indigenous peoples. Thus a large majority of the norms contained in ILO 
Convention No. 169 are expressions of customary international law (Anaya 1996: 
49-58, 107). All the documents examined above contain specific provisions relating 
to land rights and thus it could be argued that recognition of the importance of the 
ownership of homelands could accede to customary international law. However, as 
noted above, one of the fundamental elements of such customary international law is 
to be found in state practice. This practice needs to be demonstrated in the actions of 
concerned states (see Malanczuck 1997: 39). Some state constitutions do make 
reference to indigenous peoples' rightsa70 Australia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Norway 
have included or are in the process of including rights to collective ownership of the 
land. In other countries, such rights are guaranteed by treaties." ~ational ' judicial 
68 See the Statute of the ICJ, art. 38(1), the court shall apply: 'international custom, as evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law'. 
69 See North Sea conrinental shelfcases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany v. The Netherlands), ICJ Reports (1969) 3 at 44. 
70 See Canada, s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982; Chile, art. 123; Brazil, art. 231; Panama, 
art. 123; Guatemala, art. 67; Peru, art. 88, Philippines, s. 22, art. 11, s. 5, art. XI1 and s. 6, art. 
XIII. 
71 The USA and Norway; other states recognize such rights by local legislation, for example 
Ecuador, New Zealand and Venezuela. 
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decisions have also to be taken inio consideration to appreciate the existence of 
customary international law. For example, Judge Brennan who sat on the Mabo case 
in Australia stated: 
It is contrary both to international standards and to the fundamental values of our carqmon 
law to entrench a discriminatory rule which . . . denies [indigenous inhabitants] a right to 
occupy their traditional lands.72 
This quote shows that the judge has belief, or the opinio juris, that there is a fundamental 
rule in international law, applicable domestically, which states that it is illegal and 
discriminatory to deny indigenous peoples the right to occupy their traditional lands. 
To appreciate state practice relating to indigenous rights to land, the study of 
legislation and judicial decisions in Canada and Australia provides an interesting insight 
since both states have a long and difficult relationship with indigenous populations 
within their jurisdictions. Further, the land rights issues in both states are in the 
mainstream of domestic political agendas. Thus, the purpose of the following section 
is twofold: first, to provide examples of the relationship between law and the right 
to land for indigenous peoples and, second, to demonstrate that there is emerging 
customary international law concerning the importance of the land rights issue for 
survival of indigenous peoples. 
Canada 
There are approximately one million aboriginal peoples in descendants of 
the first inhabitants of North America who arrived some 12000 years ago (Elliott ' 
1997). Canada has a long history of dialogue with aboriginal peoples. While this 
dialogue was not always based on a respect for aboriginal cultures, aboriginal peoples 
have sometimes recognized the British Crown and have exchanged their lands for 
protection by the Crown. Even though, as elsewhere, there was a large process of 
assimilation, ethnocentricity and colonial politics, the Crown tried to recognize 
aboriginal peoples' customs and laws in relation to their lands. Indeed, legislation 
concerning native peoples has been part of the federal remit since 1867. This legislative 
and executive relationship can be classified into three different periods of time (ibid.: 
19-22). The first period was based on the 1763 Royal Proclamation. During that time 
for aboriginal rights to be acknowledged they were submitted to formal governmental 
recognition. Thus, land rights were dependent on legislative or executive recognition, 
which provided legal justification for the reservations. The second phase of legal 
relationships between Canada and aboriginal peoples involved the 'occupancy and 
72 High Court of Australia, Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 at 29. 
73 In the Canadian legal system the term 'aboriginal peoples' is used. Such a notion refers to 
the same group as indigenous peoples in international law. 
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use approach'. This approach was based on recognition of aboriginal occupancy and 
use of land by the common law system after the European invasion. The third phase is 
characterized by 'the land and societies approach'. In terms of the evolution of 
legislative and judicial approaches to indigenous land rights, this period from 1973- 
96 was crucial to the establishment of the theory dealing with aboriginal land rights 
in Canada. 
The case of Guerin v. R.14 suggested that aboriginal titles did not depend only on a 
royal proclamation, but derived from common law recognition of aboriginal occupancy 
and use of the land prior to European settlement. In this regard, Calder? the decision 
that recognized aboriginal rights as sui generis rights, is at the 'foundation' of the 
movement to rethink the relation between Canada and aborigines (Asch 1999). 
However, on the issue of the extinguishments of native titles, the court said, in a split 
decision (4 : 3) that such rights could be extinguished by general rather than specific 
legislation. 
The repatriation of the Canadian constitution from London to Ottawa in 1982 offered 
aborigines an opportunity to claim more legal recognition. This resulted in s, 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act 1982 that states that 'existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognised and affirmed'.76 This section of 
the constitutional act transfers aboriginal rights from common to constitutional law. 
Prior to this Act, the Canadian parliament had the power to 'extinguish' natives' rights 
and titles, a possibility aborted by s. 35(1) of the 1982 Act. While it is still possible to 
extinguish native ritghts this can only be fulfilled with the consent of aboriginal peoples. 
Nevertheless even though the Act states that aboriginal rights are constitutionally 
protected, it does not discuss any substantive content of those rights. 
The Sparrow case7' was the first in which the Supreme Court was invited to examine 
the contents of s. 35(1). In this decision the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of 
'existing aboriginal rights' as stated in the Constitution Act as rights that existed when 
the Act was passed. However, it added that 'existing aboriginal rights must be 
interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time'. The court added that 
such a position suggests that those rights are 'affirmed in a contemporary form rather 
than in their primeval simplicity and vigour'. This position rejected a 'frozen rights' 
approach as incompatible with the meaning of s. 35. In fact, this means that Canada 
offers constitutional protection not only to practices and customs of aboriginal cultures 
that pre-dated the arrival of European colonizers but also to contemporary expression 
of such cultures.78 The judgment also established how the rights protected by s. 35(1)' 
74 Guerin v. R., 2 SCR (1984) 335. 
75 Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145. 
76 Section 3 3 3 )  adds: 'For greater certainty, in subsection 1 "treaty rights" includes rights that 
now exist by way of land claim agreements that may be so acquired.' 
77 R. v. Sparrow (1990) 70 DLR (4'") 289 (SCC). 
78 Such affirmati~n closed the debate on the question of the impact of the French law governing 
property in Quebec; see R v. Cdtk, 3 SRC (1996) 139-98. 
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could be extinguished. In this decision the court ruled that aboriginal rights are 'not 
absolute'. Thus if the government decided there is need to infringe upon such rights 
and if this is justified by needs of society, it can infringe on those constitutionally 
recognized rights. The Supreme Court has set up a strict test for such extinguishments. 
For the court, s. 35 provides 'unextinguished aboriginal rights with constitutional 
protection against legislative infringement* (McNeil 1997a: 1-8). Thus, the government 
would have to prove it has valid grounds to extinguish and that it has a valid legislative 
objective respecting the fiduciary duty of the Crown regarding aboriginal  people^.'^ 
This judgment is part of the theory of the 'fiduciary duty' of the government to allow 
aboriginal peoples to use unoccupied land until it is required for alternative use. To 
appreciate if the government had 'plain and clear intention' to extinguish the aboriginal 
right, the judicial system applies a two-part test. The first part of the test is based on an 
assessment of whether legislation would infringe existing aboriginal rights and whether 
such infringement was reasonable. Second, it would determine whether the 
infringement is justifiable on any grounds. 
Another legal episode, from a lower court of British Columbia to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, concerned the sale of ten salmon for 50 Canadian dollars contrary to 
state legislation by Ms Van Der PeetSso The claimant argued that such trade should be 
recognized as an expression of traditional cultural practice of her tribe, and claimed 
protection under s. 35(1),81 The debate was whether her right to fish was protected 
under the rights of aboriginal peoples. Thus, the fundamental issue for the judges was 
to address the question: '[Hlow should the Aboriginal rights recognised and affirmed 
by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 be defined?'82 In answer the judgment stated 
that the rights: 
. . . are best understood as, first, the means by which the Constitution recograises the fact 
that prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America the land was already occupied by 
distinctive aboriginal societies and as, second, the means by which that prior.occupation is 
reconciled with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory.83 
Ultimately the Supreme Court clarified that aboriginal rights are based on two notions: 
first, that of original occupation prior to European settlement and, second; on cultural 
79 The fiduciary obligation refers to the duty of consultation that the Crown has when indigenous 
rights are involved in a decision. See Chief Justice Lamer: 'There is always a duty of consultation. 
Whether the aboriginal group has been consulted is relevant to determining whether the 
infringement of aboriginal title is justified', Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 SCR (1997), 
1010, 1081 DLR at 265. 
R. v. Van Der Peet, 2 SCR (1996) 507. 
Van Der Peet must be read with the five others decisions issued in 1996 relating to similar 
subject; see R. v. Gladstone, 21 August 1996; R. v. NTC Smokehouse, 21 August 1996; R. v. 
Adams, 3 October 1996; R. v. C8t6,3 October 1996. 
R. V. Van Der Peet, 2 SCR (1996) 507 at 299. 
83 R. V. Van Der Peet, 2 SCR (1996) 507 at 309-10 (emphasis added). 
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and traditional practices. This decision also emphasized that the purpose of s. 35(1) is 
'to reconcile prior occupancy of land by aboriginal peoples with the Crown assertion 
of sovereignty'. Therefore, it could be argued that the court acknowledged the 
occupation of the land by the aborigines as falling under the protection of the 
constitution. 
The court further established a test to determine how to prove the existence of 
aboriginal rights. This test can be summarized thus: 'in order to be an aboriginal right 
an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive 
culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right'.84 Even though this test was framed 
in the context of a traditional right to fish, it must be understood that the right to land 
is an inherent element of aboriginal rightsmp5 This extension of the principle to land 
rights returned to the agenda of the Supreme Court in the following year with 
complementary legal interpretation of constitutional protection in its decision in 
Delgamuukw v. British C ~ l u r n b i a . ~ ~  This decision followed the claim of the 'Gitksan 
and Wet'suwet'en peoples' of unextinguished title over their traditional territories in 
British Columbia. The judgment highlighted the legal importance within the Canadian 
system of the collective right to land for indigenous peoples.87 The court defined this 
title as that of 'exclusive use and occupation of land, including mineral rights and 
non-traditional uses of land' (Ulgen 2000: 148). The determination of the existence of 
a right to land is very different from the test set up for other aboriginal rights. The 
regime requires three conditions to be met for the establishment of aboriginal title. 
First, that the land must have been occupied prior to the assertion of state sovereignty 
to such land. Second, that occupation of the land be continuous though '[tlhis 
requirement does not demand an "unbroken chain of continuity" but "substantial 
maintenance of the connection" between the people and the land' (Assembly of the 
First Nations 2000: 580, quoting the Delgamuukw case). Third, that at the time of 
the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown, the occupation must have been exclusive. 
The Assembly of First Nations in Canada has highlighted that exclusivity does not 
refer to the absence of other groups on the land, but rather 'the intention and capacity 
to retain exclusive control' (ibid., citing McNeil 1989: 580). In discussing use and 
development of such land the court stated: 
If occupation is established with reference to the use of the land as a hunting ground, then 
the group that successfully claims aboriginal title to that land may not use it in such a 
fashion as to destroy its value for such a use (e.g. by strip mining it). Similarly, if a group 
claims a special bond with the land because of its ceremonial or cultural significance, it may 
For an interpretation of the meaning of such a test, see Dick (1999). 
Chief Justice Lamer stated that 'Aboriginal title is the aspect of Aboriginal rights related 
specifically to Aborginal claims to land' (1996,4 CNLR 177). 
" Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 SRC (1997) 1010. 
'' Ibid. at 1082. 
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not use the land in such a way as to d&troy that relationship (e.g. by developing it in such a 
way that the bond is destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a parking lot).8* 
Such a position must be seen as a consequence of the development of general concerns 
for the conservation of the natural environment in Canada. The Assembly of the First 
Nations has endorsed this 'underlying rationale' since 'conservation concerns are 
consistent with indigenous values and beliefs and ultimately benefit indigenous 
peoples'. Even though this decision recognized aboriginal titles as being protected 
by the constitution the case also provided the court with an opportunity to complete 
the theory of the power to 'extinguish' or 'adjust' aboriginals' titles. While in the 
Sparrow decision the court decided that in case of extinguishments, the government 
has to show 'clear and plain intention', in Delgamuukw the court specified that the 
legislation that could infringe aboriginal title must be based on the development of 
agriculture, forestry, mining and hydro-electric power, the general economic 
development of the interior, protection of the environment or endangered species, the 
building of infrastructures and the settlement of foreign populations to support those 
aims.89 Thus, in determining legality of extinguishment of aboriginal title, the judicial 
power is required to assess whether the infringement has been minimal enough, whether 
fair compensation has been paid and, finally, whether concerned aboriginal groups 
were consulted before the final decision.g0 
Thus, the Canadian system highlights three major issues regarding indigenous 
peoples' rights to landB91 First, that indigenous rights are inalienable and can only be 
surrendered by the Crown. Second, that indigenous titles arise from occupation of 
land prior to arrival of other settlers and not from any legal recognition (they are 
sui generis act). Thus aboriginal peoples have 'historical sovereignty' over their ' 
traditional lands, the proof of which is based on historical or physical occupation, 
and continuity and exclusivity of the occupation. Third, indigenous titles are 
collective and land cannot be used in a manner 'irreconcilable with the nature of the 
attachment to the land which forms the basis of the group's claim to aboriginal title'.92 
The Canadian example shows that in the last ten years the principle of cultural 
relativism concerning ownership of land has had to be recognized. As Asth points 
out, i t  is important to realize that only a few years ago the exercise of governmental 
power on the land was 'unmitigated', while 'the cunent theory of Aboriginal rights 
seeks to balance the supremacy of State power with respect for cultural difference' 
(1999: 428-46). 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 SRC (1997) 1010 at para. 129. 
89 Ibid. at para. 165 (Lamer CJ). 
90 Ibid, at paras. 167-9. 
9i Canada also offers indigenous peoples the possibility of governance of their territories in 
Nunavut, see p. 226. 
92 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 SRC (1997) 1010. 
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Australia 
Australia provides an example of one of the most amazing contemporary disputes 
between legislature and judiciary powers with regard to land rights. This debate centres 
on a definition concerning the rights of 'native title'gR holders against those of non- 
indigenous persons to use the land for their own interests. In this debate, the two 
major issues were, first, whether the annexation of territories by the government had 
extinguished native titles and, second, to establish precisely whose rights should be 
given priority - aboriginal peoples already on the land, or the incoming colonizers 
who were granted titles to use the land. Another focus of Australian legislation on this 
issue lies in the fundamental link between anti-racist legislations and land right issues 
for indigenous peoples. During colonial times, rules were based on the idea that white 
settlers had 'freehold title' over land. As a result, aborigines had no legal right to own 
land. However, the post-colonial period was equally turbulent due to the policy of 
resettlement of aborigines in reservations. In legal terms aborigines had no rights - 
not even the right to be part of a treaty. That could be explained by the fact that in 
Australia jurisdiction relating to indigenous issues was subject to provincial law while 
in Canada and the USA such jurisdiction was federal (see Bartlett 1999).94 Following 
a referendum that gave the federal government concurrent jurisdiction over aboriginal 
issues, the first recognized right arose in 1970 with constitutional acknowledgement 
that the federal government could only acquire land on a basis of 'just term'. Judicial 
action based on this principle was brought before a court to invalidate the grant of 
mining rights on traditional lands. In the decision in Milirrpum v. Nabalaco Pty Ltd 
the court stated that the 'doctrine of communal native title' was neither part of Australian 
law nor part of any common law system.94 This decision meant that valid title to land 
must have been granted by the Crown in direct consequence of the doctrine of terra 
n ~ l l i u s . ~ ~  Under this doctrine, the Crown acquired all the land in Australia, Thus to be 
recognized as the owner of a land specific recognition of this ownership was required 
from the Crown which was impossible in view of aborigines' customs and traditions 
concerning land ownership. 
, 
93 The term 'native title' describes interests and rights of indigenous inhabitants to land, whether 
communal, group or individual, possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged by, and 
traditional customs observed by, the indigenous inhabitants - National Indigenous Working 
Group Fact Sheet - Native Title. 
94 Only in 1967 did the federal government obtain concurrent jurisdiction with the states 
concernihg aboriginal peoples. 
95 This decision was mainly based on the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 
Calder that rejected the concept of native title at common law. However, eight months after 
that decision, the Supreme Court of Canada overruled the decision of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal. 
96 In a decision of 1889, Cooper v. Stuart, it was ruled that Australia had not been 'conquered' 
but 'settled'; 14 App. C?. 286 (1889). 
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The Mabo 1 decision followed a claim of the Meriam People against the State of 
Queensland, which proclaimed that some of the islands vested by the Crown, where 
the Meriam peoples used to live, were 'free from all other rights, interests and claims 
of any kind wha t s~eve r ' .~~  In this decision, the High Court decided that the Act 
established by the State of Queensland did not comply with the Racial Discrimination 
Act 197598 as such legislation denied the principle of equality before the law of the 
Meriam people. This first decision was a pre-revolutionary link wherein discrimination 
and right to own land was clearly made, but the court did not determine if aborigines 
had rights over land. The better-known Mabo decision came in 1992 and was the 
first recognition of native title (on an anti-discrimination ground). In the first 
instance, the decision recognized the existence of native title in common law. One of 
the consequences of this acknowledgment was that until explicit appropriation by the 
Crown, native title endured. Second, if native title was subject to extinguishments, 
such a procedure, if completed after 1975, had to comply with equality before the law 
as enacted by the Racial Discrimination Act. The existence of native title itself is 
based on two factors, 'exclusive occupation' of the land, and the content of the title as 
given by customary aboriginal laws (McNeil 2000 and 1997b: 117). Thus, native 
titles are distinguished from statutory land rights which: 
. . . flow from the Crown under legislation, similar to freehold and leaseholds titles. Native 
Title is not a grant created through legislation . . . [but] . . . c.omes from indigenous law and 
custom which pre-exists the Crown.99 
This decision is famous for its legal rejection of the principle of terra nullius which 
was deemed outdated, inappropriate and discriminatory. Nevertheless, titles acquired 
by white settlers during the period when terra nullius was law were still considered 
valid. Such rejection thus had no effect in relation to the past (Bartlett 1999: 413), but 
the importance of this decision was to specify that indigenous rights do not disappear 
in case of settlement. As every legal 'revolution' carries some clauses of attenuation, 
the court specified that native title 'is a form of permissive occupancy at the will of 
the crown', thus extinguishments do not require specific compensation when carried 
out in the interest or the will of the nation. 
Following the Mabo decision there was an important debate in Australia. Even 
though this decision was not perfect recognition of the right to own land for 
aborigines, public reaction was governed by the impression that aboriginal rights 
were overprotected by it. This reaction was mainly orchestrated by mining 
companies and others business interestsF" The legal result of such 'unfounded 
97 Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act 1985. 
98 This Act is the implementation of the ICERD in Australian law. 
99 National Indigenous Working Group Fact Sheet - Native Title. 
loo For an illustration of such an orchestration by mining companies, see Australian Mining 
Industry Council, Advertisement, West Australia 14 August 1993 - a campaign that asked 'Is 
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fear'lOl was the passage of a new bill before parliament, namely the Native Title Act 
1993, which recognized immunity for freehold and other titles from native title claims. 
Where other titles were threatened by the existence of native title, the Act recognized 
the legitimacy of all the Crown grants made before 1 January 1994. This Act also 
specified that if dispossession had taken place before 1975, aborigines were not 
allowed to claim title to their traditional land. It further stated that pastoral grants of 
mining interests suspended native title until the mining interest expired. The Act 
also recognized a right to negotiate over development on native title lands.lo2 When 
allowing exploitation on native land, the government was required to notify native 
title holders, and an agreement made in 'good faith' had to be elaborated between the , 
parties. Io3 
In Wik People v. State of Queensland'" the High Court was invited to resolve the 
crucial question of the relationship between the right of pastoral leases and native 
title:'Os The people of Cape York claimed ownership of their traditional land which 
was controlled by pastoral leases. Thus the issue was to define whether such grants of 
pastoral title were able to extinguish native title. This question was of immense 
importance since 42 per cent of all Australian land is held under pastoral leases. The 
majority of the court decided that the grant of pastoral leases under the Queensland 
Land Acts 1910 and 1962 did not 'necessarily extinguish all incidents of Aboriginal 
title'. This decision went beyond simply defining the relationship between native titles 
and pastoral 1eases.and aspired for equality of status between any title over the land 
and native titles.lo6 Therefore, native title fell in the same category as every other 
title and, as a result of this decision, when the Crown wished to confiscate land 
owned by aborigines it was no longer a question of extinguishment but rather a general 
this really one Australia for all Australians? . . . The Australian Mining Industry is not opposed 
to Aborigines being granted titles . . . But we believe all Australians should have the same rights 
over these titles'; as quoted in Bartlett (1999: 417). 
lo' This expression was used by Hill (1995: 306) to describe that overreaction - 'Unfounded 
fear of "~bor i~ines  claiming ;our backyard as haditional lands" spread among the general 
public'. 
IO"- 'The statutory right to negotiate provisions of the Native Title Act provide a process to deal 
with compulsory acquisition of lands for the benefit of a third party. It applies to resource 
development and land use affecting native title. It strikes a balance between the rights and 
interests of native title holders and those resources developers'; National Indigenous Working 
Group on Native Title, Fact Sheets. 
Io3 Native Title Act, ss. 26-44. 
'04  Wik People v. State of Queensland, 141 ALR (1969) 129. 
Ios 'A pastoral lease gives the lease-holder the right to use the land for pastoral purposes, including 
raising livestock and developing infrastructure necessary for pastoralism - fence, yards, bores, 
accommodation, etc.'; National Indigenous Working Group on Native Title, Fact Sheets. 
Io6 Pastoral leases were a Crown grant. 
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question of expropr ia t i~n. '~  The relationship between pastoral leases and native title 
is governed by the theory of 'co-existence'. Thus grants of pastoral leases were not 
considered to have extinguished native titles nor are they considered to have effected 
expropriation of such titles. However, the Court also defined that leaseholder rights 
prevailed over native title in cases of 'inconsistency'. Some commentators have 
highlighted that a direct consequence of the Wik decision is  'that where a subsisting 
native title right is inconsistent with another interest validly granted by the Crown, 
the other interest will prevail over native title to the extent of the inconsistency' (Dick 
1999: 68). Thus native title is considered inferior to other grants if inconsistent with 
those grants. To determine the inconsistency, the test set up in Wik is based on whether 
the! native title can be exercised without altering the grant. If alterations are created, 
the native title has to be considered legally extinguished. However, this decision left 
both communities, the aboriginal as well as the non-indigenous community, unsatisfied 
and as a result the issue of co-existence remained unresolved. 
The government proposed a 'Ten Point Plan' for adoption by parliament, most of 
which was adopted under the Native Title Amendment Act 1998. The principal provisions 
of this amendment are the validation of acts or grants made between 1994 and 1998 
(confirmation of past extinguishments), removal of rights to negotiate over acquisition 
of native title in cities and removal of the government obligation to negotiate in 'good 
faith'. The amendment also includes a list of grants that extinguish native titles permanently 
(freehold, commercial leases, exclusive agriculturaYpastoral leases, residential leases) 
(Schiveley 2000: 427). The Act also expands the rights of pastoralist leaseholders by 
diversification of activities allowed (cultivation, fishing, forestry, aquaculture, off-farm 
activities, and so on).lo8 Even though, the amendment includes a reference to the 
application of anti-discriminatory legislation, in 1999 the CERD observed that some 
of the provisions of the Act 'extinguish or impair the exercise of indigenous title rights 
and interests and discriminate against native title holders'.lB The CERD also noted: 
. . . in particular, four specific provisions that discriminate against indigenous title holders 
under the newly amended Act. These include the Act's 'validation' provisions; the 'confirmation 
of extinguishment' provisions; the primary production upgrade provisions; and the restrictions 
concerning the right of indigenous title holders to negotiate non-indigenous land uses.110 
lo' One of the legal consequences of such an evolution is that the Crown needs to show 'clear and 
plain legislative intention' to expropriate and such measure must be based on a just compensation. 
For a complete understanding of the content and the validity of this amendment, see Triggs 
(1999: 372). 
Io9 CERD, Findings on the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth), UN Doc. ERDlCl541 
Misc.4OlRev.2 (18 March 1999), para. 2 1. CERD expressed concern over the compatibility of the 
amended Native Title Act 1993 . . . with Australia's international obligations under the ICERD. 
'I0 CERD expressed concern over the compatibility of the amended Act with arts. 1(4), 2 and 5 
of the convention, in particular, that the principle of non-discrimination applies to the 'right to 
own property alone as well as in association with others'. 
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Thus the CERD found that the amended Native Title Act was in breach of the 
convention since it appeared 'to discriminate on the basis of race to the significant 
detriment of indigenous peoples and thus to breach the Racial Discrimination 
Convention and international law in other respects'.ll' 
The judicial debate concerning native titles is most evolved in Canada and Australia 
where significant developments with regard to adoption of legislation have taken place 
during the past two decades. While judicial settlement seems too insufficient, it remains 
extravagant to ask a court to determine the structure of the negotiation between 
aboriginals and settlers - to determine the structure of future relationships and what is 
ultimately required to resolve these issues (Schiveley 2000: 11). The establishment of 
political dialogue and negotiation before litigation in court is certainly preferable in 
resolution of land issues; moreover it leaves the courts as a last resort if negotiations 
fail. Thus, even though legislative innovations during recent decades are important, 
the evolution of political dialogue between indigenous representatives and governments 
on land rights merits deeper attention. To protect their specific relationship with the 
land, indigenous peoples are sometimes given a degree of governmental representation 
but this can vary significantly. In Scandinavia, for example, the Sami have a 
representative parliament that can invite national parliaments to take cognisance of 
indigenous issues. In other countries, indigenous peoples' rights to land are recognized 
via a degree of autonomy with regard to the management of territory. For example, in 
Greenland and Canada, the Inuit have access to a more developed system of self- 
governance.'I2 & 
The SamiH3 peoples, formerly, the inhabitants of Lapland, are divided between the 
boundaries of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia.ll4 Nowadays, in their relationship 
with the governments of Norway, Sweden and Finland, their situation is almost similar; 
in these three countries they have political expression within the 'Sami parliaments' 
which are advisory bodies to national parliaments and propose legislation regarding 
On the validity of the amended Act with regard to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination, see Triggs (1999). 
' I2 For a general overview concerning the current situation of the Inuit, see 'Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada', Inuit in Canada, <http:Nwww.inac.gc.ca/pubslinformation/info16.html>. 
See also <http:llwww.innu.ca> or <http:Nwww.nunanet.com/-jtagak~resourcesl (consulted 
2710810 1 ). 
'I' There are several appellations for the Sarni, they call themselves 'Saemi', 'Siipmi', or 'Saa'm'. 
In the literature the terms 'SBmi', 'Saami' or 'Same' are also often used; see Craig and Freeland 
(1998). The Sami were referred to as Lapps but after many years of campaigning by Sami 
represent,atives this term, considered derogatory, was changed. 
'I4 The Sami population is estimated to be roughly between 75 000 and 100 000, between 40 000 
and 60 000 are in Norway, 20000 in Sweden, 6500 in Finland and the rest in Russia. As there is 
no representative Sami parliament in Russia, these comments only apply to Norway, Sweden 
and Finland. 
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Sami issues.11s However, it is important to note that the Sami parliament does not ' 
have any role on the issue of ownership rights. In this regard, the Sami experience in * 
Scandinavia highlights that granting a certain degree of political representaGon before, 
or without, domestically recognizing rights to land is illusory. Even though it is very 
important that indigenous peoples have political voice within their states, the land 
rights issue is of such importance that today in all these countries the political situation 
is frozen by the lack of development on this crucial issue. 
The Inuit live in four areas: Canada, Alaska, Russia and Greenland (see Nuttall 
1994).'16 In 1992, in Northern Canada an 'Aboriginal-governed territory' called 
Nunavut was created after 15 years of negotiation between the government and the 
Inuit of the Northwest Territories.l17 The Canadian federal parliament has delegated 
territorial powers to the public government of Nunavut. Via art. 19 of the agreement 
between Canada and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, lands within the new 
territory are established as 'Inuit-owned'. Such ownership is seen as a way of providing 
and promoting economic self-sufficiency. The title is owned collectively and vested 
in the Nunavut government. Thus the situation in Nunavut presents a good example 
of the manner in which states can deal with indigenous peoples' rights to title to 
territory. 
Conclusions 
The argument often made in discussing issues of the rights of indigenous peoples to 
title to territory is that preference should be given to political discussion rather than 
judicial l i t igat i~n."~ However, while general rules cannot be inferred from the Inuit 
example it does reveal a model of a viable land management strategy within a 
demarcated territory without threatening the fundamental unity of the state. As Special 
Rapporteur Cobo has stated: 
Diversity is not, in itself, contrary to unity, any more than uniformity itself necessarily 
produces the desired unity. 
(Cobo 1983: 54, para. 402) 
The Sami have always tried to maintain a relationship between the Sami populations in the 
different countries. The Sarni Council is an NGO that represents all Sami (it has NGO status 
within the ECOSOC system). Since 1986 they have a common flag and a national anthem. The 
first Sami parliament was created in Finland in 1973, the second in Norway (1989) and the 
third in Sweden (1993). 
Il6 The political situation of Greenland is still evolving, with access to independence in the 
near future; see <http:Nwww.gh.gY>. 
Il7 Administrative difficulties delayed the official separation to April 1999. 
[ I 8  Such political dialogue is also a sign of the end of the 'paternalist' approaches of most 
western societies; approaches that were racist and destructive for indigenous societies via the 
notion of guardianship in issues governing land rights. 
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International law as regards land rights of indigenous peoples is underdeveloped in 
comparison to national laws. The ILO Convention remains the only legally binding 
instrument specifically addressing this issue. Even though general protection is afforded 
by human rights law, this is only a protection by default. The national legislations of 
Canada, Australia, Finland, Norway and Sweden all point towards an evolving body 
of international customary law. In these countries national legislation has evolved 
because of international pressure. In all the case law studied explicit references to 
international law were made and such case law was of crucial importance for the 
evolution of national legislation. Even though international law regarding indigenous 
land rights is not strong, state practice reveals that judges have the belief (opinio 
juris) that a change in their national legislation dealing with land rights is necessary 
as regards indigenous peoples. Therefore, international customary law as both practice 
and opinio juris seems to exist in the international arena. Since the land rights issue is 
a primary issue for indigenous peoples there remains great scope for the evolution of 
international norms in this respect. Triggs (1999) summarizes four salient points 
pertaining to existing international law regarding the indigenous land rights issue. 
Building on this, national legislations and international law could be said to have 
evolved in four main directions: 
1 Recognition and protection of the relationship between indigenous peoples and 
land as indicated by joint arts. l (1)  and l (3)  of the 1966 Human Rights Covenants. 
2 Indigenous peoples have 'some rights to own land in association with others and 
to inherit that land', as provided by the principle of non-discrimination under 
ICERD. l9 i 
3 Indigenous peoples have a right 'not to be discriminated against on the basis of 
race and to have the benefit of law to ensure substantive equality' as given by 
art. 1 of ICERD. 
4 Law has to clearly stipulate that 'where a government acts in relation to indigenous 
title it is bound to ensure participation in the decision through full and bona fide 
consultation with, and in some instances, through the consent of, the indigenous 
peoples concerned and to provide full compensation where their rights are adversely 
affected'. I2O 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that even when such rights are theoretically 
recognized by national legislations, their practical implementation is always very 
different. In the words of Moses, the Grand Chief of the Grand Council of Crees: 
H9 For text and references of those instruments, see WCN.4/Sub.2/2000/25, Annex. 
This discussion was central to debates at the World Conference Against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, September 2001. This 
conference might be another forum for indigenous land claims. See <http://www.un.orgl 
rightsJracism/>. 
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Under this system, and as exemplified by Canada, it is the aboriginal peoples who must 
attempt to claim back from the state tlie lands we have lived on for thousands of years. And 
it is the state which determines the validity and extent of the claim and its final resolution. 
The baseline or starting-point in this process is total dispossession. The onus is upon the 
indigenous peoples to prove their indigenous ancestry, their original possession, and the 
extent of the use of their lands and territories. It is the state that makes judgement, and it is 
the state that is the ultimate beneficiary. Finally, in perhaps the most confounded and 
convoluted contradiction of all, the indigenous peoples must surrender to the state their 
aboriginal title in order to have title to their meagre remainder confirmed through treaty by 
the state. The alleged objective is to provide the state with some guarantees of 'finality' and 
'certainty'. 
(Moses 2000: 167) 
In the future it is clearly essential to recognize the importance of the land rights issue 
for indigenous peoples. If there is no progress on this issue, international law will be 
unable to offer adequate protection, thus rendering previous declarations of concern 
expressed by the international community as empty rhetoric. It is clear that such 
development must be carried out in the face of a 'global market' that commercially 
values indigenous lands and seeks acquisition of territories where natural wealth is 
concentrated. Thus there is a real threat of increase in the claims of states, multinational - 
companies and indigenous peoples for ownership of these territories. In this potential 
battle indigenous peoples in their precarious position are particularly poorly protected. 
As stated by Rapporteur Daes, 'the gradual deterioration of indigenous societies can 
be traced to non-recognition of the profound relationship that indigenous peoples 
have to their lands, territories and resources, as well as the lack of recognition of other 
fundamental human rights' (Daes 2000: 3). 
8 Conclusion 
One of the preconditions inherent in the definition of a state in modern international 
law is that it will have a defined territory.' This single.concept is enshrined as one of 
the main conditions concomitant to statehood and is given by the Montevideo 
Convention 1933.2 For most sovereign states this condition is apparent enough, yet 
the process of colonization has rendered the notion of territory in some entities 
extremely problematic3 Modem international law has been slow to address these 
notions of territoriality since it is framed from a particular perspective that has not 
been forced to consider these kinds of issuesm4 Rather, in seeking to address the growing 
spate of violence induced by conflict over territory it has invoked legal notions that 
were first developed during the Roman era. Roman property regimes and their resultant 
principles, notably uti possidetis juris, have been applied and reapplied in different 
contexts to become the problematic bedrock of the treatment of territory within modern 
international lawe5 
The work undertaken in this book involved the questioning and critical analysis of 
some of the basic underlying assumptions inherent in the transmission of the doctrine 
to modern situations. For this purpose it started by setting out the manner in which the 
doctrines of uti possidetis have come to be interpreted in modern international law. 
This initial chapter laid down the basis against which the intertemporal development 
of the law was then examined. However, as has been established, the actual treatment 
of uti possidetis juris in contemporary international law is far removed from its original 
development as an interim mechanism available to the praetor under Roman private 
law. Chapter 2 examined these contextual nuances of the norm vis-h-vis its original 
application within Roman jurisprudence in a bid to assess its relevance towards 
transposition into international jurisprudence by classical jurists such as Gentilli and 
Vattel. Initially applied as an equitable principle that informed the rulings of the Roman 
. For a treatment of territory in international law, see Jennings and Watt (1992: 563-718). 
Article 1, Montevideo Convention 1933 states: 'The State as a person of international law 
should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; 
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.' 
As can be seen in liberation movements in countries such as India, Nigeria, Sudan, Indonesia 
and the Philippines. 
For the impact of western notions, see Mazrui (1975). 
For a 'general reading on uti possidetis, see Ratner (1996), Shaw (1996) and Castellino and 
Allen (2000). 
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praetor in disputes between individuals over a possession, it assumed that the possessor 
of a disputed property would be considered its owner in the interim while the claimant 
had to demonstrate his6 case against them. However, when transmitted into international 
law this basic principle was called upon to justify the boundaries left in Latin America 
by the Spanish and Portuguese as they were defeated in the face of the Creole liberation 
action.' In the interests of order the ~ r e o l e s  decided that the doctrine of uti possidetis 
would be most appropriate. They interpreted this doctrine to mean 'as you possess so 
you possess' and when applied to the unfolding decolonization of Latin America it 
was considered to validate the boundaries left behind by the colonial powers, which 
the new incumbents to power decided by concensus not to challenge. The result was 
that former administrative boundaries within the Spanish Empire were transformed 
into international frontiers with the same technical sanctity afforded them that was 
bestowed upon historical negotiations of territory between sovereigns in Europe. The 
guarantee of these boundaries benefited the Creoles for a number of reasons, most of 
which could be attributed to the maintenance of order in a period of transition. Attendant 
to the use of the doctrine of uti possidetis in this context was the development of 
another important and extremely vital concept. This concept was that of terra nullius 
and the resonance of it pertained to the acquisition of territory. International law, as it 
had developed at the time, was clear that only unoccupied territory could be legally 
acquired (Jennings and Watt 1992: 567). All other acquisition of territory would need 
to take place via other means existing within international law, such as cession or 
treaties of accession. This doctrine was essentially set up to prevent wide-scale 
acquisition of the territory of one state by another - which would be to the detriment 
of international order. While the colonization of America had already taken place in 
contravention of this prevailing principle, past actions were prevented from being 
judged against the contemporary standard by use of the rule of intertemporal law. 
This rule is vital to the dynamics of international law since it deems that all actions 
need to be judged in the strict temporal context in which they occurred, so as to prevent 
the retrospective application of more modem ideas to activities that took place before 
their development. The prime aim is to prevent the finding of past injustices against 
the vagaries of legal evolution. Thus while the colonization of the Americas was beyond 
the scope of international law, the Creoles, in seeking to ensure that Latin America 
would never be the victim of further European colonization, sought to rein in the 
principle of terra nullius by declaring that there was no such territory in Latin America. 
By this statement they inferred that all territory in the continent came within sovereign 
jurisdiction of an existing power. These concepts were sanctified in numerous treaties 
In Roman law women did not have any rights to property due to their status in society as 
'minors'. 
For a general reading on the contribution of Latin America to international law, see Alvarez 
(1909) and Woolsey (193 1). 
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and were even included in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.8 However, the use of this 
terminology by the Creoles was essentially flawed since in claiming the territory 
without the acquiescence of the native peoples of Latin America they had implied 
acceptance of it as terra nullius before their own arrival and therefore capable of their 
own occ~pa t ion .~  Nonetheless, in sanctifying interpretation of the doctrines of terra 
nullius and uti possidetis and seeking to crystallize them within international law with 
reference to regional custom, it could be argued that the doctrines themselves came to 
signify a particular meaning relevant to Spanish decolonization. These events took 
place towards the middle and latter stages of the nineteenth century and, it could be 
argued, reflected the standards developing in international law against notions of 
conquest, occupation and colonization of international territory. 
Despite these developments, further colonization did take place. Unable to turn 
west to colonize, the imperial powers of Europe competed against each other in seizing 
territories elsewhere (see Pakenham 1991). The worst affected was the continent of 
Africa where in a frenetic swoop towards the end of the nineteenth century, the 
European powers began the process of carving out and demarcating territory between 
themselves armed with the philosophy of the 'three Cs' - civilization, Christianity 
and co rnmer~e . ' ~  Chapter 4 analysed the process by which this philosophy was 
accompanied by various international legal developments wherein the powers sought 
to agree between themselves and justify their action by recourse to various principles 
of public international law. This process was largely achieved by means of 'treaties' 
of dubious validity in international law, with spurious and sometimes fraudulent 
entitlements (Touval 1969). Nonetheless since the powers themselves remained the 
ultimate gatekeepers of international law the process remained skewed in their favour. 
. However, with decolonization gaining steam in the face of the self-determination 
movements of the UN era, these colonies gradually began to unravel (see Sureda 
1973). The situation was now similar to that faced by the Spanish in the face of Creole 
action, and once again the response was dictated by the need to preserve order. The 
process of division of territory in Africa had been informed in most instances by 
nothing more than a desire to restrict the influence of a rival's jurisdiction and rarely 
pertained to naturally occurring fault lines, nor to tribal or traditional custom." As a 
For general reading on the Monroe Doctrine, see Hughes (1923) and Jessup (1935). 
For the significance of terra nullius in international law, see Jennings and Watt (1992: 564). 
lo  For more information, see Gann and Duignan (1969-75) Vol. 1 and Flint (1988). 
In the words of Lord Salisbury: 'We [the colonial powers] have engaged. . . in drawing lines 
upon maps where no white man's feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and 
river$ and lakes to each other, but we have only been hindered by the small impediment that we 
never knew exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were'; as cited by Judge Ajibola, 
Case concerning the territorial dispute (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya v. Chad), ICJ Reports (1994) 
6 at 53. 
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result, African administrative territories that 'belonged' to the various powers seldom 
corresponded to pre-colonial dimensions of past kingdoms or tribal lands. In the 
negotiations that took place between two or more European powers over territory that 
they did not know or understand, they cut across all kinds of traditional divides.12 
When it was time to decolonize the same principles that informed the Spanish 
withdrawal in Latin America were called upon and thus, via the principle of uti 
possidetis, these random and problematic administrative boundaries took on the sanctity 
of international frontiers. While this was, in most instances, conducive to peace, security 
and order in the short-run, it proved extremely difficult to sustain. As a result, a spate 
of violent renegotiations began, starting with the actions in Katanga and Biafra. The 
Organization of African Unity, the regional body, was extremely concerned by these 
threats to statehood and adopted the strongest terms by which to protect the territorial 
sovereignty of states.13 
Problems concerning territoriality and its allocation persist, as can be seen in the 
numerous cases brought before the International Court of Justice as states seek 
delimitation of boundaries that pertain to historical allegiances against the weight of 1 
rigid and alien principles such as utipossidetis. Eight of these cases have been reviewed 1 
in the fifth chapter of this book to analyse the extent to which states recognize and I 
comply with the doctrine of uti possidetis and also to examine the means by which ( 
they seek to justify their positions against this doctrine. The pleadings to these cases ' 
are rich material for the presentation of alternative histories of these territories, which 
reveal various intricacies that remain unaccommodated within the rigid treatment of 
territory in international law. Also included in various cases are the pronouncements 
of the jurists of the ICJ and their analysis of the doctrines and the manner of their 
application in the different contexts. One of the major problems with this particular 
regime of redressal is that it remains closed to non-state actors. Yet it is non-state 
actors who are in the forefront of the renegotiation of territorial rights. Modem 
international law has come a long way since its acceptance of the discourse as being 
purely one that governed relations between states. Indeed non-state actors have an 
increasing role to play within international society, whether in the form of international 
NGOs,I4 pressure groups15 or national liberation movements.16 Yet the ICJ in its current 
I2 See the Libyan pleadings in the Libya-Chad case, ICJ Reports (1994) 6, Libyan Written 
Pleadings at p. 88 para. 4.46. 
l 3  Resolution 16(1) of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government at Cairo in July 
1964. This provided that 'all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing 
on their achievement of national independence'; cited in Brownlie (1971: 360-1). 
l4 For example, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch play a significant role in the 
perpetration and monitoring of worldwide human rights standards. 
I S  For example, child rights NGOs have been allowed to participate in the discussions of the 
Committee for the Rights of the Child. 
l6 The Palestinian Liberation Organization was granted observer status in the UN General 
Assembly on 22 November 1974; see General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX). 
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format is unable to accommodate the interests of these groups even if they represent 
those most affected by the doctrinal injustices of the past. In addition, the mechanism 
of the ICJ, structured as it is to adjudicate disputes between states, fails to provide 
remedies in intra-state conflicts over territory. The last two chapters of this book have 
focused on two such contemporary situations within states, where issues of the title to 
territory were raised and required clarification. 
The first situation examined concerned the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. This 
conflict dominated international attention for much of the 1990s and initially began 
as a movement within the state of Yugoslavia by which different groups within the 
federal state sought to protect and strengthen their position in the face of growing 
ethnic identification. However, this process was overtaken by events that unfolded at 
a frenetic pace. As a result the body set up by the European Commission Committee 
on Yugoslavia to draw up a new constitution that would accommodate the different 
peoples of the state within a new structure was forced to 'creatively interpret' its own 
role (Terrett 2000). Thus the Badinter Arbitration Commission that had been set up to 
negotiate with different powers in the disintegrating state in a bid to agree on a 
constitution that would benefit and protect the rights of the different peoples was 
forced instead to rule on issues of territoriality within modern international law. This 
change of role was essentially brought about by the speed of events that ruled out the 
possibility of accommodation within the state and instead saw the creation of new 
states from the six republics. Once again order was threatened, and the commission 
responded by professing the doctrines of uti possidetis in seeking to sanctify 
administrative boundaries within the former Yugoslavia. This process was accompanied 
by numerous problems, partly a result of the changing role of the commission itself, 
but the opinions of the commission, nevertheless, present a modern interpretation of 
the doctrines governing the treatment of territory in international law. 
The second contemporary situation examined focused on the intricacies of the 
treatment of territory in a completely different setting. While studying different 
territories and different eras, it is easy to ignore, as has been done in the creation and 
sustenance of the sovereign state, indigenous peoples who have lived largely 
uninterrupted in particular territories. These peoples, sometimes oblivious to systems 
that are developing around them, are suddenly required to conform to alien systems 
for their possession of their land to be recognized internationally. In addition, more 
often than not, their right to the land that sustains them has been ovemdden by the 
propagation of settlers and settlements that contradict their ethos and render them 
bereft of the basic rights that they have been exercising for centuries. Modern 
international law and its accompanying principles have been unable to penetrate this 
area of law since it has traditionally come within the strict purview of the mandate of 
the sovereign state, even if that mandate was not necessarily achieved taking into 
aceount the rights of these indigenous peoples. Thus, the situation in many states with 
indigenous peoples is more akin to the issues concerning Creole action in Spanish 
America than the classical vision of self-determination that is synonymous with the 
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romantic notions of decolonization i'n the UN era." Even in that particular era, the 
rights of indigenous peoples and other peoples who were in a non-dominant position 
within the transfer of power were rendered voiceless. Thus the final chapter sought to 
examine the issues concerning indigenous peoples through the lens of different 
instruments of international and national law. In this sense the book has sought to 
present a chronological analysis of the issues that have shaped doctrines governing 
territoriality in international law and to examine them against the growing norms of 
human rights and entitlements within modern international law. 
One of the most important purposes of this exercise concerns the analysis of the 
issue of the intertemporal rule, Past injustices such as colonization are usually protected 
from intense scrutiny by modern international law through this rule. The rule itself 
needs to be commended since it would clearly be unjust to seek to project a more 
progressive notion of law and its underpinning morality onto the actions of the past 
in a bid to seek culpability. This would violate basic legal entitlements against 
retrospection in contradistinction to revisionist notions. While the validity of revisionist 
notions is being questioned in other forums, it is not the purpose of this book to 
question the rule itself. Rather the purpose of this book is to demonstrate the extent 
to which the rule is incoherently and often inappropriately applied to situations 
governing the treatment of territory in modern international law. If it is argued that the 
actions of the imperial powers in annexing territories in Africa in the late nineteenth 
century are beyond culpability since they ought to be subject to the intertemporal 
rule, then the temporal context of that time bears examination. 1t is in this quest that 
the decolonization in Latin America provides the appropriate temporal context. By , 
analysing and discussing notions that concerned not only territoriality but also the I 
manner of conquests of colonies it could be argued that the tone had been set, in 
customary international law at least, for the development and further solidification of 1 
norms of international law against wanton conquests and annexation of territory. I 
Although the norms had developed to this extent and were considered appropriate 
in Latin America, they were nonetheless either held to be invalid or disregarded on i 
purpose in the colonization of Africa. Indeed the situation was compounded by blatant 
violation of the norms governing the signing of 'treaties' as European powers sought 
to challenge each other in a bid to accumulate colonies in the continent. Further, in 
decolonizing these territories the need for 'international' order was considered so 
sacrosanct that it overruled the history and geography of the post-colonial entities. 
Rather than accommodating and negotiating with the diverse peoples that came 
within the rigidly defined territories, the simplistic decision was taken to maintain 
colonial boundaries, an action that was bound to have longer term implications. This 
action, while nearly universally accepted by western-trained state leaders in Africa, 
failed to accommodate non-state actors who sought to gain legitimacy by seeking 
statehood themselves. The result has been numerous so-called conflicts of 'post-modern 
l7 For notions of classical and romantic self-determination, see Koskenniemi (1994: 249-5 1). 
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tribalism' (Franck 1993: 3) as attempts are made to reformulate artificial colonial 
boundaries (of significance for only fifty years or less) along more historical lines. 
While the application of the doctrine of uti possidetis, which solidifies the sanctity 
of colonial boundaries, does allow change in the face of consent, it is important to 
stress that this consent is required between existing sovereign states. Non-state actors 
have no explicit right to demand territorial adjustment even though the right to self- 
determination is enshrined as the first and foremost right in the two international 
covenants of 1966 that are the blueprint for the human rights regime. Thus existing 
states have sought to minimize the impact of the right of self-determination by declaring 
it as a right that only exists in an 'internal' guise. While notions of international order 
are to be cherished, the offer of autonomous regimes to groups that fail to see why 
they should exist within an externally defined unit for the sake of the historical 
convenience of a colonial power remains difficult to resolve. The fact that this historical 
convenience is in somecases further perpetrated by neo-colonists who fail to represent 
the inhabitants of a given territory serves only to aggravate the situation. This can 
often result in aggrieved and unrepresented peoples within a state seeking secession 
and in bid to access the international right to self-determination these groups attempt 
to pierce the veil of domestic sovereignty and internationalize their conflicts with 
their respective state governments. 
Thus in summarizing the propositions of this book the following points can be 
made. 
1 International law governing territoriality is premised on private law notions that 
emanate from Roman property regimes attributable to jus civile and jus gentium. These 
notions were applicable to the treatment of immovables when disputes arose between 
two or more parties with regard to possession of a given property. Accordingly the 
praetor ruled on interdictory proceedings wherein interim possession of the property 
would be given to the existing possessor while the claim of the aspirant was examined. 
2 The Creole action in Latin America sought to app1.y this concept to sanctify 
boundaries inherited from colonial regimes in a bid to prevent the disintegration of 
these units. It was felt that such disintegration would hamper immediate development. 
In seeking clarification of these terms in international regional custom, the Creoles 
sought to codify other principles of international law too. One of these is the notion of 
arbitration to settle disputes, which has had some resonance in the determination of 
title to territory. The other concept that has been more important from the perspective 
of this examination of principles in international law is the consolidation of the denial 
of the notion of terra nullius. 
3 It could be argued that the Creole action and subsequent continent-wide discussions 
and treaties emanating from the New World with regard to the treatment of territory 
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were an indication of existing customary international law. In this context it needs to 
be stressed that the Creoles were not the first to discuss the notions of the occupation 
of territory. The laws governing the acquisition of territory had already been in place 
prior to the Creole action. This action merely strengthened norms such as terra nullius 
and refocused them within the remit of international law, 
4 In annexing territories in Africa, the imperial powers sought to justify their action 
by recourse to domestic laws as well as international legal principles. However, the 
principles in acquisition of territory were selectively applied and, as a result, even 
though an international conference such as the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884- 
5 took place, the competitive nature of the quest prevented any real crystallization of 
consensus on issues governing the treatment of colonial territory. As a result, the 
acquisition of territ~ry in Africa became an adversarial exercise wherein one power 
sought to outdo its rivals in making territorial claims. These claims were based on 
notional occupation and spurious 'treaties' that defeated principles of international 
law at the time. 
5 The argument that the actions of the colonial powers in Africa are beyond reproach 
within international law is justified by application of the intertemporal rule. This rule of 
law states that actions of a given era must only be judged against the standards prevailing 
in that era and not by modern more progressive standards. It is argued that the standards 
prevailing at the time of the 'Scramble for Africa' could be viewed comprehensively 
under the guise of the legal tenets expressed in treaties signed in Latin America; and 
they clearly reveal the extent to which the laws governing treatment of territory had 
already developed. Therefore in wilfully choosing to disregard these laws, the colonial 
powers ought not to be able to claim refuge under the intertemporal rule. 
6 The International Court of Justice has reiterated the importance of order in 
delivering its judgments. In this context it has validated the doctrine of uti possidetis 
and applied it in various cases, using as the 'critical date', the departure of the colonial 
power. Yet in doing so, it has admitted that the maintenance of these regimes is based 
on uncertain colonial legal regimes and that there is a revisionist quality about the 
doctrine itself. In the course of different pleadings, the court does seem to reveal a . 
strong western bias which treats territory as a possession belonging to a sovereign 
even where that possession could not be justified as being de jure at that time. The 
court is also extremely restricted in the number of cases it can try based on the 
acceptance of its jurisdiction and the fact that non-state parties cannot access it. 
The recent proliferation of cases might suggest a change in the attitudes of state 
parties towards the court but this remains difficult to justify at this stage. 1 
7 The Badinter Opinions, especially the so-called 'Badinter Principles', are instructive 
on the development, application and dangers of modern notions of territoriality. 
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Commissioned to work with disputants in Yugoslavia in a bid to create a multi-ethnic 
constitution, the Badinter Commission's work quickly exceeded its mandate, 
Nonetheless, being the prime legal organ in place during the conflict, it was asked for 
its opinions on various matters. While the Opinions are ridden with difficulties, some 
scholars have backed the expression of the Badinter Principles. These principles support 
the sanctity of boundaries and their inviolability. There is also explicit support for the 
doctrine of uti possidetis in the Opinions even though it had hitherto only been used in 
the context of decolonization. The rigidity of the boundary regime in the former 
Yugoslavia, where the sanctity of boundaries was held irrespective of ethnic fault 
lines that were still in the process of being negotiated, led to numerous conflicts that 
continue to remain a threat to longer term order, even if in the short-term the threat 
appears to have been alleviated. 
8 The people with the best claim to territory remain those of indigenous origin, Not 
having had to claim territory in the manner that is inherent in settled cultures, their 
failure to assert this right was taken by the settlers as proof that the territory they 
inhabited was terra nullius, and on those territories regimes were built that excluded 
their original owners. This was either justified on the basis that the peoples were not 
socially and politically organized enough to dispel the notion of terra nullius and 
thereby save themselves from occupation, or assuaged by the signing of unequal treaties 
that would be of dubious value in modern international law. These indigenous peoples 
have tried to seek redress through international mechanisms for the protection of 
minority rights, but their claims are particularly different because of the thrust of the 
territorial element that is contained in them. While this claim might be seen as evidence 
that they now subscribe to similar notions of territoriality as the settled communities 
upon the lands, in most cases it is in fact simply a call to be able to claim in the settled 
sense, the territory that was traversed by their forefathers; the rights to which have 
been lost in obscure legal regimes to which they did not subscribe. 
Modern international law as a discourse is premised upon notions of justice and order. 
While it is imperative that a legal regime protect the interests of order, to do so at the 
cost of justice suggests the interplay of political elements. While it is impossible to 
separate the legal from the political it is important to stress that the legal may contain 
an inherent political element. If this assertion can be accepted, it also suggests that the 
doctrines that have been rigidly interpreted as strict laws should be examined against 
the different contexts in which they have been developed and subsequently applied. 
To apply a concept that was incorrectly transposed from the obscure confines of Roman 
private law governing a dispute over immovable property to sanctify colonial 
boundaries is problematic in itself. To alter the doctrine to suggest a new rigidity 
strjctly applicable to colonial situations is to aggravate the grievance. However, this 
now largely flexible and broad doctrine has been applied to non-colonial situations by 
the Badinter Commission in its Opinions on the disintegration of Yugoslavia. What is 
238 Title to Territory in International Law 
particularly problematic about this application is the manner in which the commission 
accepted it as a universally accepted rule that was to govern every situation in which 
new entities would come to power. Selectively quoting from the Burkina Faso/Mali 
case, it ignored the basic premise that the doctrine was applicable only in the post- 
colonial context. Meanwhile, the negotiation for land rights by indigenous peoples 
continues unabated, with sporadic progress due to the territorial nature of the sovereign 
state. Modern international law is largely helpless in assisting this cause and thus 
despite pronouncements regarding the right to self-determination and non-governance 
by foreign domination, the discourse is unable to penetrate the facade of domestic 
sovereignty that governs these causes. This has severely hampered the treatment of 
land rights and, as a result, they remain open to the vagrancies of particular state 
policies whether through the misapplication of the right as in the 'land reform' 
movements in Zimbabwe or in the continued denial of land rights to indigenous peoples 
worldwide. 
